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Abstract   A significant problem hindering the emergence or the continued
growth of aquaculture in many marine areas is the conflict that arises among it
and other ocean uses. We develop a framework to clarify the choice of the opti-
mal scale of aquaculture when that use impacts a commercial fishery. We
identify a range of potential impacts, both positive and negative, and analyze
how one or more might affect the carrying capacity of a fish stock. We conduct a
numerical simulation to illustrate a case where aquaculture and fishery uses in-
teract in the ocean and compete in the product market, and we find that an
ocean area could be devoted exclusively to aquaculture. This result depends
strongly upon assumptions about the nature of the interaction, the geographic
distribution of fish, and the aquaculture production technology. We also investi-
gate the behavior of the model when both uses are able to coexist.
Key words   Aquaculture, wild-harvest fishery, bioeconomics, spatial allocation,
carrying capacity, user conflicts.
JEL Classification Codes   Q12, Q22.
Introduction
In this paper, we examine the interactions between marine (or estuarine) aquaculture
and a wild harvest fishery. These two uses of the ocean may vie over physical space,
impose external costs (or benefits) on each other, and compete in downstream mar-
kets. In many instances, fishermen and aquaculturists may gain access to the ocean
under different sets of rules and legal rights. Where such disparate property systems
are not fully integrated, and uses are partially or fully exclusive, conflicts are bound
to arise. If property rights are ill defined, or if they are spread across a large number
of users, then classic Coasean solutions to external effects may not be realizable.
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Here, we explore the implications for the coexistence of commercial fisheries
and aquaculture in a particular ocean region. We consider first what happens when
aquaculture is introduced into a region where an open-access fishery is established.
Next, we consider the effects of aquaculture on the price of quota in a fishery in
which a system of individually transferable quotas (ITQs) has been implemented.
Finally, we develop a model to determine the optimal long-run, steady-state scales
of fishing and aquaculture, assuming that the fishery can be regulated with taxes or
ITQs. We develop a numerical example to illustrate the sensitivity of the optimal
outcome to alternative parameter values.
A wide range of potential interactions may arise between aquaculture and com-
mercial fisheries (table 1). The type of interaction may depend upon the classes of
species grown or caught and the technologies utilized for each activity. Interactions
may involve a decrease in the physical space available for prosecuting a fishery;
possible increases in the costs of either wild harvest or aquaculture as more space is
devoted to the alternative use; the culling of juvenile fish from a wild stock for
growout in a culture facility; changes in the level of nutrient enrichment; and the
risks of genetic mixing or displacement and the spread of disease. These are the
types of interactions that have been highlighted, mostly in a negative sense, by envi-
ronmental groups (cf., Goldburg, Elliott, and Naylor 2001). Although the culturing
of one species could affect the status of a range of species or the characteristics of
an entire ecosystem, in this paper we focus mainly on the effects on a single species.
The most obvious type of competition between aquaculture and a fishery is over
physical occupation of the ocean. The siting of an aquaculture facility, such as a net
pen, longline, or seafloor growout, may displace some forms of commercial fishing
activity. If the wild stock is unavailable for harvest because of the failure of fish to
migrate out of an area allocated for culturing, then the “effective” carrying capacity
may be reduced. This issue is analogous to the question of the diffusion rate of a
fish stock out of a marine reserve (Mullen 1989). As more space is allocated for
aquaculture, there may be both a smaller stock available for fishing and more con-
gestion in the areas remaining open for wild harvest. These effects could lead to
increases in the cost of fishing. On the other hand, as more area is allocated for wild
harvest, the cost of aquaculture might increase if the potential for achieving econo-
mies of scale is constrained.
Another type of competition occurs through the culling of juveniles from a wild
stock to supply aquaculture operations. If the juveniles have not yet recruited to the
Table 1
Aquaculture and Wild Fishery Interactions
Wild Stocks Þ
Aquaculture Salmonids Groundfish Pelagics Shellfish
Salmonids p(G), p(D) K, Cf, Ca Cf, Ca
Groundfish K, Cf, Ca, J, p(G), p(D) Cf, Ca
Pelagics K, Cf, Ca J, p(D), Cf, Ca
Shellfish Cf, Ca Cf, Ca Cf, Ca, J, p(D)
Key: K = the carrying capacity of the commercial fish stock is impacted (negatively or positively);
Cf = the cost of fishing increases as the area allocated to aquaculture increases; Ca = the cost of aquacul-
ture increases with increasing fishing effort; J = juvenile fish may be culled from the wild stock for
growout; p(G) = the risk of genetic pollution; p(D) = the risk of the spread of disease.Aquaculture and Wild-Harvest Fisheries 131
spawning stock, then culling could affect the carrying capacity of the fish stock as a
consequence of recruitment overfishing. Culling has been proposed for the culture
of bluefin tuna, Atlantic sea scallops, and summer flounder.
A final type of competition concerns the external effects of aquaculture on a
fishery. First, the release of nitrogen from feeds and fish wastes might lead to nutri-
ent overenrichment and eutrophication, particularly in protected bays or small
estuaries. Second, the potential exists for the spread of disease from cultured fish,
leading to declines in the wild stocks. Third, if the cultured fish are genetically dif-
ferent from wild fish, there may be some potential for affecting the biological
fitness of the wild stock if releases or escapes occur. In such a case, aquaculture op-
erations might be confined to a relatively small area of the ocean, with only a minor
physical displacement of the fishery. The release of nutrients, disease, or genetically
altered fish, however, might have effects that reach far beyond the actual culturing
facility.
The potential for conflicts between commercial fisheries and aquaculture has
been appreciated in only a few places to date, but it is likely to become a more sig-
nificant  problem  as  aquaculture  continues  to  expand  worldwide.  At  an
FAO-sponsored meeting in 1986 focusing on the problems of small-scale fisheries in
the western Mediterranean, the participants identified “major problems in the com-
petition between aquaculture and fisheries … over uses of space, living resources,
human and financial resources, and market competition for seafood” (Charbonnier
and Caddy 1986, p. 47).1 In the early 1990s, in North West Connemara (on the west
coast of Ireland), local fisherman perceived that the “expansion of [salmon] farms
result[ed] in an increasing number of restricted areas for fishing” (Steins 1997, p. 3).
The fishermen formed a shellfish cooperative to secure aquaculture licenses so that
they could safeguard access to their historical fishing grounds. In the Norwegian
town of Vega, conflicts between aquaculture and the commercial herring fisheries
have been settled through the use of a “first in time, best [sic] in right” rule
(Doksroed 1996). The application of this rule, however, may be made difficult by
fluctuations in fish stocks that lead to variations in the level of fishing activity and
therefore in the extent to which fishermen are using areas of the ocean. In 1996, the
siting of an experimental aquaculture growout facility for sea scallops off the coast
of Martha’s Vineyard, MA (USA) was delayed, in part, because of the opposition of
commercial fishermen to the site originally proposed on the basis of historical pat-
terns of fishing (WSC 1998).
In New Zealand, Hickman (1996, p. 452) notes that the 30-year history of
aquaculture there has been one of competition for coastal waters and that “on occa-
sions direct competition has occurred between aquaculture and traditional fishery
interests.” Most recently, permit applicants for green-lipped mussel longline cultur-
ing operations have come into conflict with southern scallop fisheries in Tasman
Bay and Golden Bay. Grey and Sullivan (2003) explain that commercial fishermen
in New Zealand argue that ITQ rights ought to include a guaranteed right of access
to ocean areas sufficient to catch the quota. There is now a moratorium on all new
marine farming in New Zealand ostensibly to develop a more rational approach to
the allocation of ocean space (Grey 2002).
McVey (2001) of the US National Sea Grant College Program has argued that
aquaculture and fisheries will need to be managed together in order to optimize
value. In a similar vein, Ferlin (1986) calls for an integrated management approach
to both improve marine fisheries and develop the aquaculture industry.
1 On the other hand, Jordana i de Simon (1999) reports that there has been no interference between fish-
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The literature on the economics of aquaculture is small but growing rapidly.
Existing studies in this area may be categorized into two groups. The first
group focuses on the economics of aquaculture operations, including the analy-
ses of production processes (Kite-Powell et al. 2003a, 2003b; Kazmierczak and
Caffey 1995; Arnason 1992; Karp, Sadeh, and Griffin 1986) and downstream
product markets (Engle and Kouka 1995; Kouka 1995).
The second group examines the biological and market interactions between
aquaculture and commercial fisheries. For example, Anderson (1985a) models
the interactions between ocean ranching (the hatching and release of smolts of
anadromous fish, such as coho salmon (Oncorhynchus kisutch), which migrate
into ocean waters and later return to be harvested by the rancher) and commer-
cial fishing. The author shows that there is a range of prices within which both
ranched and wild fish stocks can coexist. However, there is a limit price above
which the wild stock could be driven to extinction through overfishing stimu-
lated by the release of large numbers of the ranched fish. The range of prices
under which both stocks can coexist can be increased either through restrictions
on wild harvest fishing effort or by reducing the catchability of the ranched
stock. Cooperative management can result in profits from both activities.
Anderson and Wilen (1986) examine the implications of private salmon
ranching in the Pacific Northwest on market structure, salmon prices, wild har-
vests, ranch output, and salmon fishing regulation. The authors model the
behavior of a dominant salmon rancher facing a competitive open-access fish-
ery. Primary attention is given to the factors that influence the strategies of an
optimally managed salmon ranch under selected institutional and biological
constraints. The effect of such behavior is evaluated with regard to salmon
prices, natural salmon stocks, ocean fishing effort, and ocean fishery productiv-
ity.
In another study, Anderson (1985b) presents a single-species model in
which cultured finfish competes in the same market as a perfect substitute for a
wild harvest product. There is no biological interaction or geographical compe-
tition between the aquaculture operations and the commercial fishery. The
author concludes that the entry of competitive aquaculture firms leads to in-
creases in the stock of wild harvest fish, thereby complementing wild harvest
fishery management objectives, and benefits consumers through increases in the
total supply of fish to the market and price reductions. Green and Kahn (1997)
find a similar result and use it to argue for the subsidization of aquaculture.
We consider two general types of interactions: those that take place in the
ocean and those in the market. We start with an examination of the competition
between aquaculture and fishing in the ocean. Aquaculture may also compete
with wild harvest fisheries solely in the market. This appears to be the situation
in the world salmon market, where low-cost aquaculture production may be
causing the wild harvest fishery in Alaska to slump. Recently, Alaskan fisher-
men and processors have been attempting to differentiate the product through
an unsuccessful effort to certify the wild harvest as “organic.” This type of
competition is an interesting case in which technological innovation may lead
to the displacement of more traditional forms of production, with potentially
important ramifications for ecosystem health and social welfare. We do not con-
sider this case explicitly in this paper, although the essence of the problem is
found in a more general model that considers competition in the ocean as well
as in the downstream market.Aquaculture and Wild-Harvest Fisheries 133
Competitive Interactions in the Ocean
We begin with a traditional production function for a wild harvest fishery:
hf = qXE, (1)
where hf is the level of landings from the wild harvest stock, q is a catchability coef-
ficient, X is the size of the natural fish stock, and E is a variable that represents
aggregate fishing effort for a fleet of homogeneous vessels.
Let r be an intrinsic growth rate of the fish stock, and let K represent the
fishery’s carrying capacity in stock units. We assume that the fish stock is distrib-
uted uniformly over the area of the fishery, so that K can also be denominated in
units of area.2 Let S be the area devoted to aquaculture, and let K be a linear func-
tion of S so that the carrying capacity changes with S at a constant rate j:
K(S) = K - jS. (2)
In principle, K(S) could either increase or decrease with increases in S. An ex-
ample of the former could occur where the nutrients from an aquaculture operation
enhance local productivity. For example, lobster stocks are believed to benefit from
the siting of mussel growout facilities. Examples of decreasing K(S) with increasing
S include the physical displacement of fishing, interference with the ecosystem to
create conditions where fish cannot exist, the spread of disease from the cultured
stock to wild fish, or even the release of genetically inferior stocks into the wild. In
the following illustrations, we focus mainly on the case where j > 0, implying that
K(S) decreases as more ocean space is allocated to aquaculture.
We employ a simple surplus production model to describe the growth, G(X,S,E),
of the wild stock when it is being fished:
G(X,S,E) º X
·









- hf (X, E). (3)
At a steady-state equilibrium, equation (3) describes the classic downward slop-
ing linear population equilibrium relationship between fishing effort, E, and the fish
stock, X. The intrinsic growth rate, r, is a fixed parameter. When j > 0, it is straight-
forward to show that the equilibrium stock size declines as more and more ocean
space is devoted to aquaculture. Figure 1 depicts this relationship for an open-access
fishery. As the value of j increases, K will decrease. The fishing effort intercept of
the population equilibrium curve stays fixed, but the curve rotates toward the origin,
thereby reducing the steady-state stock associated with any level of fishing effort.
For a fixed level of fishing effort, say, one with a management goal of achieving
MSY (horizontal line in figure 1), yields must drop as the available stock declines.
We now begin to consider some of the economic aspects. If we assume first that
the fishery and aquaculture products are identical and undifferentiated in the market,
2 This assumption is critical to the analysis. If it is known that the stock is distributed nonuniformly,
then it may be possible to site aquaculture operations in such a way as to reduce the likelihood of im-
pacts on the fishery. Many jurisdictions use the historical distribution of fishing effort as a way to select
locations for the siting of aquaculture facilities. This approach is not necessarily economically efficient,
but it may minimize the costs associated with political conflicts.Hoagland, Jin, and Kite-Powell 134
then consumers should be indifferent with respect to the source of seafood. We model
the total costs of fishing as an increasing linear function of fishing effort: TC = cE,
where c is the unit cost of effort. In an open-access fishery, rents are dissipated, im-
plying that it may be economically efficient for aquaculture to expand and displace
the fishery completely. This result is definitely true if aquaculture can generate pro-
ducer surpluses and produce at least as much fish as the open-access fishery was
producing, because there will be no decrease in consumer surplus. Moreover, the
economy conceivably might benefit more, even if somewhat less fish is produced by
aquaculture, for two reasons: the open-access inefficiency would be reduced (or re-
moved) and aquaculture producers might earn surpluses.
Another important consideration is what happens to the commercial fishing fleet.
Ostensibly, there is no change in producer surpluses for fishermen, because resource
rents are fully dissipated in open-access equilibrium. As the carrying capacity contracts,
the sustainable revenue curve shifts down (figure 2). This shift forces the open-access
fishing effort to decline, or, equivalently, it forces vessels to exit the fishery. Thus, we
might expect considerable opposition by commercial fishermen to the introduction of
aquaculture if it is expected to reduce the effective carrying capacity of the fishery.
Figure 1.  Population Equilibrium Relationship for a Fishery with Contracting
Carrying Capacity (hypothetical parameterization)Aquaculture and Wild-Harvest Fisheries 135
There will be opposition to aquaculture in an optimally managed fishery as
well. Figure 2 shows that both the optimal level of fishing effort and resource rents
will decline as the carrying capacity contracts. To see this in another way, we can
explore the relationship between the value of fishing quota, m, and changes in the
carrying capacity. We assume the market price of fish, p, is a constant, and we dis-
count the future at rate d. For an optimally managed fishery, the stock size can be
solved as a function of the model parameters only (Clark 1990), including the im-
portant parameter K(S):
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Define the value of fishing quota as follows:
m K(S) [ ] = p -
c
qX K(S) [ ]
æ 
è  ç 
ö 
ø  ÷ . (5)
Substituting the optimal stock size into equation (5) gives us a functional rela-
tionship between the price of quota and the effective carrying capacity, as shown in
Figure 2.  Decline in Open-access Fishing Effort with Contracting Carrying
Capacity (hypothetical parameterization)Hoagland, Jin, and Kite-Powell 136
figure 3. Assuming that the fish stock is distributed uniformly over the fishing
grounds, this relationship provides a way of measuring the opportunity cost of the
expansion of aquaculture. If fishermen hold the property rights, then the curve rep-
resents a minimum compensation schedule for the purchase of rights to conduct
aquaculture in the ocean.3
Competition Over Space and in the Market
In order to explore the optimal allocation of space between a commercial fishery
and aquaculture, we first need to characterize the economic dimensions of the
aquaculture operation.4 We specify a linear production function for aquaculture:
ha = wS, (6)
Figure 3.  Decline in the Price of Fish Quota with
Contracting “Effective” Carrying Capacity
Hypothetical parameterization; note that carrying capacity is declining to the right.
3 In Japan, for example, fishery cooperative associations hold the rights to areas of the coastal ocean for
commercial fishing; aquaculture operators must obtain the right from a cooperative in order to grow fish
(Murai 1992).
4 This framework is analogous to the multiobjective policy model for marine aquaculture developed by
Sylvia, Anderson, and Cai (1996), although we do not specify a set of “policy weights” on the two uses.Aquaculture and Wild-Harvest Fisheries 137
where ha is farmgate output and w is a positive coefficient. According to this model,
a larger area, S, is needed if aquaculture is to increase its supply to the market. We
assume that capital and labor are proportional to acreage.5 We model the costs of





Further, there is a cost of investment in aquaculture, I(z), in which z is an incre-




We define total benefits as the sum of revenues from the commercial wild har-
vest of fish and the production of fish by aquaculture. Total benefits are a function
of E, X, and S:
B(E, X,S) = Bf (hf) + Ba(ha). (9)
A hypothetical regional manager chooses the levels of fishing effort, E, and in-
vestment in aquaculture acreage, z, to maximize the net benefits of fish production
from both the wild harvest fishery and aquaculture production:











5 This specification of the production function simplifies our analysis. In reality, there may be important
substitution possibilities between area and other factors (i.e., capital equipment, feed, labor). MTI
(1998) includes a description of the production technology for fluke in the ocean, but it does not explore
substitution possibilities among factor inputs. Analysis of the tradeoffs among these possibilities and
their relationship to the problem of competition with commercial fisheries is a topic for future research.
6 It is also conceivable that the cost of fishing will be an increasing function of the space allocated to
aquaculture, for example, because of gear conflicts or increased congestion. If this is true, then increases
in S would tend to shift the total cost of fishing up at all levels of effort, resulting in a qualitative effect
similar to the reduction of effective carrying capacity. In order to focus mainly on the effect of S on the
reduction in carrying capacity, we do not model its effect on fishing costs. A more general model has
been explored by Jin, Hoagland, and Kite-Powell (2003).Hoagland, Jin, and Kite-Powell 138
The current-value Hamiltonian is:
H = B(E, X,S) - Cf(E) - Ca(S) - I(z) + l F(X,S) - qEX [ ] + bz. (13)
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As an example, we assume that aquaculture will produce the same species as the
commercial fishery and that the product is undifferentiated in the market. Take a lin-
ear demand function: P = P0 – x(hf + ha), where P0 is the choke price and x is the
slope. As a consequence, the benefit function (9) becomes:
B(E,X,S) º (P 0 - xh)dh
0
h f +ha
ò = P0 hf (E, X) + ha(S) [ ] -
x
2
hf (E, X) + ha(S) [ ]
2
. (18)
We specify the cost and investment functions as linear functions:7
Ca = vS (19)
I = bz . (20)
Equations (14) through (17) become:
l = P 0 - x(qXE + wS) - c (qX) (21)
b = b (22)
l
·
- l d - r + qE + 2rX (K - jS) [ ] + qE P0 - x(qXE + wS) [ ] = 0 (23)
7 Here, we ignore congestion costs or other externalities, suggesting d2Ca/dS2 > 0, or possible scale
economies, suggesting d2Ca/dS2 < 0.Aquaculture and Wild-Harvest Fisheries 139
b
·
- db + w P0 - x(qXE + wS) [ ] - v - lrjX2 (K - jS)2 = 0. (24)
Assuming that a steady-state equilibrium is feasible, equations (21) through
(24), together with equation (3), can be used to solve for X as a function of E. S is a
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The solution at steady-state can be determined as follows.8 First, for any E cal-
culate X using equation (25). Then calculate S using equation (26). Next, calculate l
using equation (21), at the steady state, dl/dt = 0. Finally, substitute E, X, S, and l
into equation (24). The optimal level of effort, E*, is a positive solution to equation
(24) when db/dt = 0.
Model Simulation
In order to examine the interactions between aquaculture and a commercial fishery,
we consider a hypothetical case in which aquaculture produces the same species as
the commercial fishery. The growout of fluke in floating netpens (on the surface or
submerged) has been proposed as a potential aquaculture product along the New En-
gland coast. One prototype fluke growout operation has been operating sporadically
off the coast of Plum Island, New York, in recent years (Link 2002).9 Fluke netpen
operations can be stocked with juveniles produced at an onshore hatchery or by the
wild harvest of juveniles in a nearshore pot fishery. We assume that the cost of juve-
niles from either source would be a part of the operational costs of the aquaculture
operation. The product would be sold in the market for flatfish or, potentially, in the
high-end market for sushi. We focus on the former, as the market for the latter is not
thought to be large (although it could be quite lucrative). Here, we abstract from the
commercial harvest of other species, the important recreational fishery for fluke,
and the effects of existing conservation and management measures, among other
complications.
We borrow estimates of parameters from the literature. The US National Marine
Fisheries Service has developed a surplus production model for fluke (SARC 2000).
8 In this problem, we have a system of six equations, (3), (12), and (21) through (24), and six unknown
variables, l, b, E, z, X, and S. The steady-state values for the variables may be solved simultaneously.
Because of nonlinearity, the analytical solution involves multiple roots. Depending on the values of co-
efficients (such as d and v), negative or complex roots must be eliminated in the process. Because the
analytical solution is lengthy and does not yield any significant insights, we adopt a numerical proce-
dure that is both relatively simple and gives us more control in searching for interior solutions.
9 Another prototype, focusing on winter flounder (Pleuronectes americanus) and Atlantic halibut
(Hippoglossus hippoglossus), is under development by the University of New Hampshire off the coast of
Isles of Shoals in the Gulf of Maine.Hoagland, Jin, and Kite-Powell 140
The model suggests an intrinsic growth rate, r, ranging from 0.49 to 1.08 year-1.10
We adopt the lower growth rate as a baseline for simulations. We use an estimate of
the catchability, q, of yellowtail flounder (Pleuronectes ferrugineus) of 0.000011
days-1, obtained from a study of the New England groundfish fishery (Edwards and
Murawski 1993). We focus on the fluke fishery in Rhode Island Sound, and we esti-
mate a carrying capacity for fluke of 35 million pounds (17,500 short tons [ST]),
which is 15% of the current estimate of biomass capable of producing maximum
sustainable yield in the Sound (SARC 2000).11
We calculate an average price of $1.82 per pound ($3,640 ST-1) for summer
flounder from recent data on the national value of landings divided by national land-
ings. Use of this price abstracts from regional and seasonal variations in price as
well as premiums known to be paid in the market for different grades of fluke. We
have been unable to find a published model of the demand for fluke, so we borrow a
demand slope parameter, x, for yellowtail flounder of $0.017 ST-2 from the Edwards
and Murawski (1993) study. We calculate a choke price, P0, of $3,668 ST-1 for a lin-
ear demand curve using the slope parameter and the point represented by price and
the 1999 Rhode Island commercial landings of fluke of 818 ST. The US Mid-Atlan-
tic Fishery Management Council’s fishery management plan for summer flounder,
scup, and black sea bass identifies four size classes of trawlers that catch fluke, but
most landings are made by the two intermediate size trawler classes (MAFMC
1998). We employ an average estimate of unit fishing costs, c, of $3,300 day-1 for
these two classes, based upon unpublished data compiled by the NMFS Northeast
Fisheries Science Center (Gautam and Kitts 1996).
For the culturing of fluke, the following parameter estimates were obtained
from a model developed at the WHOI Marine Policy Center (Kite-Powell et al.
2003b): annual yield, w, is 120 ST acre-1; annual aquaculture production cost, v, is
$470,000 acre-1; and the cost of new investment, b, is $90,000 acre-1. Investments in
equipment are assumed to have a life of 15 years. Production costs include the costs
of maintenance and the purchase of juveniles for growout.
If the net benefits from aquaculture exceed those from the commercial fishery,
then a regional manager would want to allocate all of the available space to aquacul-
ture (and vice versa). When we run the model with our baseline parameter values,
we find that it is optimal to allocate the entire region to aquaculture. We emphasize
that this simulation result is an illustration of the model, not an empirical result that
might be used to argue for a specific allocation policy. Importantly, significant
changes in any one parameter value or a combination of parameter values will pro-
duce the result that it is optimal for the entire region to be allocated for a wild
harvest fishery. In general, we find that, given the current functional forms and pa-
rameter values, the model typically results in a corner solution favoring one of the
two uses.
In order to examine more closely the nature of the tradeoff between aquaculture
and the fishery, we modify some of the baseline parameters so that the model pro-
duces an internal steady-state equilibrium. In effect, we consider a case where the
coexistence of both uses is the economically optimal outcome. We adjust carrying
capacity, K, from 17,500 to 175,000 ST; aquaculture yield, w, from120 to 200 ST
acre-1; aquaculture production cost, v, from $470,000 to $534,000 acre-1; and we
contract demand, while keeping the choke price fixed, by increasing x from $0.017
10 For comparison, in their study of the New England groundfish fishery, Edwards and Murawski (1993)
employ an intrinsic growth rate of 0.23 for yellowtail flounder, a related species. The NMFS surplus
production model is still under development, and it has not been utilized to manage the fishery to date.
11 Fifteen percent is the average annual harvest share for Rhode Island during 1980–92 (MAFMC 1998).Aquaculture and Wild-Harvest Fisheries 141
to $0.034 ST-2. All of these parameter changes seem plausible, except possibly the
increase in carrying capacity, which is larger by an order of magnitude.
Figure 4 depicts production possibility surfaces in which aquaculture production
measured along the ordinate is traded off against fishery landings measured along
the abscissa. The points along any surface represent combinations of production
possibilities for a fixed set of model parameters. Only one of these points, repre-
sented by the dot on each curve, represents the optimal combination of production.
The figure shows how the production possibilities change when the parameter j,
which affects the carrying capacity of the ecosystem for fluke, is varied by 20%.
Here, an increase in j from 100 to 120 ST acre-1, representing a more significant
negative impact of aquaculture on the carrying capacity, moves the optimal solution
to the corner favoring commercial fishing; a decrease to 80 ST acre-1 moves the opti-
mal solution to the corner favoring aquaculture. We attempt to explain this
seemingly counterintuitive result below.
When the model is parameterized to yield an interior solution, we can examine
the effects of small changes in each of the parameters on the optimal levels of the
control, E, and state variables, S and X, in the model. The model exhibits varying
degrees of sensitivity to changes in the range of parameters. In order to compare
these sensitivities, we represent these changes as elasticities (ratios of percentage
changes in the variable of interest to percentage changes in the parameter being var-
Figure 4. Production Possibility Surfaces
These surfaces illustrate the tradeoffs between aquaculture and the wild harvest fishery as the interac-
tion term j is varied by ± 20% from a baseline interior solution (the black dot on the heavy middle
curve), j = 0.10. Black dots represent points of optimality. Units are expressed in thousands of short
tons (ST). Parameters are discussed in the text.Hoagland, Jin, and Kite-Powell 142
ied) in the neighborhood of the initial values (table 2, column 2). These elasticities
are summarized in columns 4 through 6 of table 2. Both the direction and size of
these changes are of interest. Given the large number of parameters, we discuss only
a few of the apparently counterintuitive results here.
All three variables are most sensitive to changes in the following three param-
eters: the unit cost of aquaculture, v; the marginal productivity of aquaculture, w;
and the choke price, P0. Interestingly, when the unit cost of aquaculture, v, is in-
creased, instead of making aquaculture less competitive with commercial fishing,
the model selects a new optimum in which more acreage is allocated for aquaculture
and less effort is devoted to commercial fishing.
To gain some insight into why this happens, we consider the relationship be-
tween the dynamic marginal cost of aquaculture with respect to fish yield, MCa, and
the dynamic marginal costs of fishing with respect to yield, MCf, at the steady state.
Define the marginal benefits of supplying the market from both sources as
MB = P0 – x(qEX + wS). In our problem, a regional manager maximizes the benefits
of fish production from both (either) the wild harvest fishery and (or) aquaculture.
As shown in figure 5, this is the area below the demand curve and above the supply
(i.e., marginal cost) curve(s). When MCa < MCf is always true over the entire range
of aquaculture production levels (MCa is always below MCf in figure 5), we have a
corner solution in which the entire market is supplied by aquaculture. In contrast,
when MCa > MCf is always true, the fishing industry is the sole supplier.
In an interior solution (see figure 5), the wild harvest fishery is more competi-
tive than aquaculture (MCf < MCa) within a certain range of production (hf), and
when  market  demand  is  greater  than  hf,  aquaculture  becomes  less  costly
(MCf > MCa). In this case, the rest of the market is supplied by aquaculture (ha).
Thus, the market-clearing quantity is hf + ha and the price is MB. In other words, at
market equilibrium the marginal cost of production from either activity must equal
MB ( = MCa = MCf). Using equations (24) and (23), we derive the following expres-
sions for MCa and MCf, respectively.12
Table 2
Elasticities of Model Variables
Initial
Values Units E X S
P0 3,640 $ ST–1 307.61 7.37 –31.54
v 534 $ x10 3 AC–1 –300.85 –7.99 37.02
w 0.200 STx10 3 AC–1 267.61 7.40 –31.20
j 0.100 ST x10 3 AC–1 25.35 0.60 –3.81
r 0.490 time–1 13.96 0.30 –2.68
d 0.070 6.90 0.15 –0.73
b 90 $ x10 3 AC–1 –3.49 –0.10 0.47
x 0.034 $ x10 –3 ST–2 –2.87 –0.07 0.35
c 3.300 $ x10 3 day–1 –1.86 0.96 –1.83
q 0.000011 day–1 1.08 –1.00 1.91
K 175 ST x103 –0.99 –0.02 3.15
12 We substitute for l using equation (21) and b using equation (22). Then we solve both (23) and (24)
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MCa =

























where we define mcf = c/(qX) to be the marginal cost of fishing with respect to yield,
hf, for the current period.13
Note that in a static model, the marginal cost of aquaculture would be v/w. In
either the static or dynamic case, MCa increases as the unit cost of aquaculture, v, is
raised. Equation (27) illustrates that in a dynamic model, the interactions between
Figure 5. Marginal Costs of Fishing (MCf), Marginal
Costs of Aquaculture (MCa), and Demand
Note: Total fish production equals the sum of supplies from both the wild fishery, hf, and
aquaculture, ha. A regional manager’s objective is to maximize net surpluses, represented
by the area ABCP0. When aquaculture is more productive than the ocean per unit area,
MCa will decline with increases in area, S. Under certain types of parameter changes,
such as an increase in the unit cost of aquaculture, v, an efficient outcome requires that
more ocean space be allocated to aquaculture. Although MCa will shift up with a higher
v, MCf also shifts up to a relatively greater extent, so that the distance BC ( = ha =  wS)
gets larger. Note that net surpluses will always decline with an increase in v.
13 Because hf = qEX, we can write the total cost of fishing as cE = c[hf/(qX)].Hoagland, Jin, and Kite-Powell 144
fishing and aquaculture and the effects of discounting also affect MCa. An interest-
ing question is how MCa might be affected by S. Differentiating MCa with respect to















Thus, the dynamic marginal cost of aquaculture is reduced through an expansion of S.
Next, we consider the dynamic marginal cost of fishing (MCf). Equation (28)
shows the effects of discounting and stock growth in a dynamic model. Note that
equation (28) is identical to the marginal condition of a model that focuses only on a
commercial fishery, except that here the growth function (F) is affected by S. In our
formulation of the problem, an expansion of S always results in an increase in
MCf (dMCf /dS > 0). Thus, the market equilibrium is a result of the interaction be-
tween the two opposing effects (i.e., dMCa /dS < 0 and dMCf /dS > 0).
We use these insights to explain why, when v is increased, the optimal alloca-
tion of space requires an expansion of aquaculture. We know that MCa increases as v
is raised. However, we can lower MCa by allocating more area to aquaculture. Fur-
ther, MCf increases with an expanding S, until it just meets the decreasing MCa (i.e.,
the gain from lowering MCa just offsets the loss from rising MCf). The new equilib-
rium occurs where more space is allocated to aquaculture, even though unit cost is
larger. Of course, the net benefit must be lower with a higher v.
Conclusions
A wide variety of potential interactions may arise between aquaculture and commer-
cial fisheries. Depending upon the species and technologies involved, these
interactions may be competitive or complementary. As an example of the latter,
Hickman (1996) describes the merger of technologies from a wild harvest fishery
and aquaculture to undertake spat collecting, growout, seabed seeding, and dredge
harvesting in the New Zealand southern sea scallop fishery. More frequently, how-
ever, the two uses are competitive; and user conflicts could grow as aquaculture is
increasingly looked to as a source of supply of seafood protein. We develop a frame-
work for improving our understanding about these interactions. Our hope is that
with this improved understanding, we may be able to manage fishery resources more
efficiently and mitigate potential user conflicts.
We show first that the commercial fishery’s equilibrium stock size declines as
more ocean space is devoted to aquaculture. When the fishery is open access, it may
be optimal for aquaculture to displace the fishery — even when aquaculture is pro-
ducing a different species. This result depends upon the size of consumer surpluses
for the products of the two uses and the fact that rents are dissipated in the open-
access fishery. Under the right conditions, the entry of aquaculture also could force
wild harvest fishermen to exit the fishery, implying that there may be considerable
political opposition to aquaculture in an established fishery — even if it is managed
14 This condition can be interpreted as requiring that the marginal increase in productivity of aquaculture
with respect to S must exceed the marginal loss in productivity for the wild fishery when more space is
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for maximum economic yield. We consider the nature of the tradeoff between a
rights-based fishery with rights to quota and aquaculture with rights to geographic
space. Where the fishery has pre-eminent rights, the relationship between the value
of quota and the effective carrying capacity, which may vary with the scale of
aquaculture development, defines a minimum compensation schedule for quota
holders — assuming that the fish stock is uniformly distributed over the fishery.
We develop a framework to analyze the tradeoffs between a wild harvest fishery
and aquaculture occurring in the same region (defined by the fishery) and selling
into the same market. In the framework, aquaculture affects the fishery’s carrying
capacity and supplies a portion of the market. The framework can be used to iden-
tify the economically optimal scale of both aquaculture and a commercial fishery.
Our results suggest that when aquaculture exerts a significant negative impact on the
fishery, the economic optimum often is associated with a corner solution of the
model (i.e., the region should be allocated exclusively for either aquaculture or com-
mercial fishing), and the coexistence of the two uses is suboptimal. Using baseline
parameters for a hypothetical case involving fluke in Rhode Island Sound, we were
unable to find a superior equilibrium solution involving the coexistence of both
uses. In general, if the net benefits from aquaculture exceed those from commercial
fishing, then it is economically optimal to replace the fishery with aquaculture (and
vice versa). We note that economically optimal adjustments along the path to equi-
librium or, what is even more likely, political accomodations could well lead to a
situation where both uses coexist. Further, we have abstracted from the real world
where other uses, including nonmarket uses such as recreational fishing and ecosys-
tem conservation, should enter into allocation decisions.
With modified parameter values, we examine internal steady-state solutions to
consider what happens when both uses coexist. The framework shows that the opti-
mal values of the control and state variables are most sensitive to the choke price
and to both the unit cost and marginal productivity of aquaculture. We find,
counterintuitively, that the optimal scale of aquaculture expands (and optimal com-
mercial fishing effort contracts) when the unit cost of aquaculture increases or when
the marginal productivity of aquaculture decreases. This result is due to the interac-
tion between the dynamic marginal costs of aquaculture and those associated with
the wild harvest fishery. An important question for future research concerns the
generalizability of this result to real-world examples of aquaculture-fishery interac-
tions.
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